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Abstract
It is undisputed that the United States Government has a
paramount interest in maintaining national security, ensuring the
nation’s territorial integrity, and protecting the American people.
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement is an example of power that the Government has in
order to serve those interests. The border search exception is very
old, enacted by the First Congress in 1789. Although it is not a wellknown exception, it has serious implications on both personal and
data privacy. Data privacy in the twenty-first century is a growing
concern for the American people. Technology becomes more
intricately interwoven into our most personal lives, seemingly,
every day. Forensic searches of electronic devices at the
international border are per se reasonable under the border search
exception. However, some courts have taken issue with the privacy
concerns involved with forensic searches of electronic devices and
have held that forensic searches of electronics are not per se
reasonable. This Comment explores the trajectory of the border
search exception and the Fourth Amendment, how courts have
1057
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wielded the Fourth Amendment in order to address privacy
concerns, and how judicial interpretation and Congressional
inaction has led to inconsistent applications of the border search
exception as applied to forensic searches of electronics.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. When Coming Home is Much Harder Than Leaving
People travel internationally for a myriad of reasons: family,
business, pleasure. More than 379 million travelers passed through
United States Customs and Border Control Protection in 2017.1 For
many Americans, international travel is routine. For others, reentering the country at our international border turns into a
nightmare.2
Imagine you have just been abroad on vacation. After long
hours of travel, your flight lands back in the United States and you
make your way to customs, expecting everything to run smoothly.
Instead, you are unexpectedly selected for a random search. You are
exhausted from the flight home and now you are nervous. You are
seated in a room with a customs agent and the agent asks you
multiple questions about where you work, what you were doing
abroad, and what your business is.
Abruptly, the agent asks for your phone. You are startled, but
you hand it over. Then, the agent asks for your passcode so he can
unlock your phone. Something about this does not feel right to you.
You ask why they need to search your phone. Instead of answering,
the agent hands you a form that describes the border patrol agents
right to access and copy the contents of an electronic device.3 The
form also states that refusal to cooperate could lead to seizure of the
1. CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and
FY17 Statistics, CUST. B. & DEC. (Jan. 5, 2018), www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-electronic-devicedirective-and [hereinafter CBP FY17 Statistics].
2. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Alasaad v.
McAleenan, No. 1:17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2017) [hereinafter
Alasaad Complaint] (outlining the complaints alleged by the American Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts against the Department of Homeland
Security on behalf of eleven travelers whose electronic devices were searched
without warrants at the United States international border). In November 2019
the Massachusetts District Court held that reasonable suspicion is required for
forensic electronic searches at the international border, but probable cause and
a warrant is not. Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 195556, at *59 (D. Mass. Nov. 12, 2019).
3. See Jason McGahan, Meet the NASA Engineer Suing the Government for
Searching His Smartphone, LA WEEKLY (Sept. 19, 2017), www.laweekly.com/
news/nasa-engineer-sidd-bikkannavar-is-suing-the-government-for-searchinghis-smartphone-8662896 (discussing the details of Sidd Bikkannavar’s
experience before and during his electronic border search at George Bush
Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas).
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device and detention of the traveler.4 This scares you, so you tell the
agent your passcode and then he disappears, taking your phone
with him. You sit in that room, not knowing what is happening or
why. The agent eventually comes back, returns your phone, and
giving no explanation about what he was doing or what he did with
your phone, tells you that you can go.
For the 30,200 international travelers entering or leaving the
United States in 2017, that was the best case scenario they
experienced.5 Some travelers were detained for mere minutes while
others were detained for hours while their electronics were searched
without explanation.6 Some travelers had their devices confiscated
and returned weeks or months later while they were forced to leave
without their belongings.7 Many who have been searched have filed
complaints with the Department of Homeland Security and the
American Civil Liberties Union, describing feeling humiliated,
disturbed, and made to feel like a criminal or a terrorist.8

B. What About My Right to Privacy?
Existing privacy laws in the United States developed as need
arose.9 This created a makeshift structure of statutes and common
law jurisprudence that is woefully inadequate in addressing current
digital privacy concerns.10 In 2019, cell phones are ubiquitous with
an astounding 96% of Americans owning a cellphone of some kind.11
The percentage of American smartphone users has increased
significantly from just 35% in 2011 to 81% in 2019.12 As
technological capabilities and consumer use grows, oftentimes
important issues fall outside the scope of specific laws and remain

4. Id.
5. CBP FY17 Statistics, supra note 1 (detailing how in the fiscal year 2017,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection conducted 30,200 border searches of
electronic devices of international travelers both entering and leaving the
country).
6. Charlie Savage & Ron Nixon, Privacy Complaints Mount Over Phone
Searches at U.S. Border Since 2011, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017),
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/us-border-privacy-phonesearches.html (detailing multiple individuals’ accounts of their detentions
during their electronic search at the border).
7. Id.
8. Id. See, e.g., Alasaad Complaint, supra note 2.
9. Cameron F. Kerry, Filling the Gaps in U.S. Data Privacy Laws,
BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/07/12/
filling-the-gaps-in-u-s-data-privacy-laws/ (discussing the mismatch between the
advancement and creation of data and digital information and the laws that
govern and protect that data and privacy).
10. Id.
11. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., INTERNET & TECH. (June 12, 2019),
www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (discussing mobile phone ownership
and dependency over time).
12. Id.
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unaddressed.13
Digital privacy at the international border is one of those issues
that remains unaddressed in a meaningful way.14 Without guidance
from Congress, the judiciary is left scrambling to piece together
exactly what digital privacy at the border should look like.15 In turn,
a growing number of judges find it difficult to apply the rulings of
pre-digital cases to the invasive searches of digital data.16

C. What Happens Next (In This Comment)?
As this Comment will illustrate, the Fourth Amendment’s
exception to searches conducted at the international border is well
established.17 As technology has altered and advanced, so has the
13. Kerry, supra note 9.
14. Protecting Data at the Border Act, S. 823, 115th Cong. (2017). This Act
was introduced to “ensure the digital contents of electronic equipment and
online accounts belonging to or in the possession of United States persons
entering or exiting the United States are adequately protected at the border,
and for other purposes.” Id. This Act would allow a government entity to access
the digital contents of any electronic equipment belonging to or in the possession
of a United States person at the border only with a warrant supported by
probable cause. Id. This Act has not been voted on nor confirmed. Id. Supporters
of this act believe that it will protect digital privacy at the border in a significant
way. Matthew Guariglia, Congress Should Pass the Protecting Data at the
Border Act, EFF (June 14, 2019), www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/06/congressshould-pass-protecting-data-border-act. Those who oppose the Act argue that
“searches of digital devices are necessary to protect national security
and…supporters’ fears of pervasiveness are overblown.” Protecting Data at the
Border Act Would Prevent Customs Officials From Seizing Your Laptop or Phone
and Downloading the Contents, GOVTRACK INSIDER, www.govtrackinsider.com/
protecting-data-at-the-border-act-would-prevent-customs-officials-fromseizing-your-laptop-or-phone-f918dd9ce96c (last visited Dec. 14, 2019).
15. Id.
16. Nathan Freed Wessler & Esha Bhandari, Another Federal Court Rules
the Fourth Amendment Applies at the Border, ACLU (May 9, 2018),
www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/privacy-borders-and-checkpoints/
another-federal-court-rules-fourth-amendment (discussing the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Kolsuz and other cases that courts
have heard regarding forensic digital searches conducted at the border and how
those courts have ruled).
17. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding that
travelers may be stopped when crossing the international boundary because of
national self-protection); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (stating that a person’s right to be let alone does not
prevent the search of his luggage during a border search); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 622 (1977) (reiterating longstanding recognition that
border searches are reasonable without probable cause or a warrant); United
States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding no
articulable suspicion is required for border searches); United States v. Montoya
De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (commenting that the Fourth
Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the
international border); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152
(2004) (stating that the Government’s interest in preventing the entry of
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border);
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need for privacy protection.18 But so far, our laws have not kept up.19
The lack of clear guidance regarding whether additional reasonable
suspicion is required in a forensic electronic border search is
currently left to judicial interpretation and as a consequence, has
led to a federal circuit split.20 For now, whether border agents need
reasonable suspicion in order to forensically search electronic
devices depends entirely on where a person enters the country.21
This Comment will explore the trajectory of the border search
exception and the Fourth Amendment, how courts have wielded the
Fourth Amendment in order to address privacy concerns, and how
judicial interpretation has led to inconsistent application of
Americans’ fundamental rights.

II. BACKGROUND
Before delving into the complex issue that is digital privacy at
the international border, one must understand how and why this
issue is so very important to the American people. Accordingly, this
Comment will first provide an overview of the Fourth Amendment
and its interplay with privacy. This section will then turn its focus
to the border search exception, one of the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. Finally, this section provides a
brief history of the border search exception and how it has been
manipulated through time and technology.

Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1339 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding the
Fourth Amendment’s protections wane in limited context, one of those at the
international border where the government’s interests reach its zenith); United
States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 728 (11th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that
the Fourth Amendment is relaxed at the international border because of the
strong policy of national self-protection).
18. Kerry, supra note 9.
19. Id.
20. Compare United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (holding that the uniquely sensitive data on electronic devices carried
with it a significant expectation of privacy…and the forensic examination of
Cotterman’s computer required a showing of reasonable suspicion), and United
States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2018) (contending that Riley v.
California made it clear that a forensic search of a digital phone requires some
level of individualized suspicion), with United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227,
1234 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that reasonable suspicion is not required to
perform a forensic search of an electronic device at the border; distinguishing
Riley as applicable only in search incident to arrest situations and not
applicable at the border).
21. Ayako Hobbs & Thomas Zeno, Circuits Split About Border Search of
Electronic
Devices,
ANTICORRUPTION
BLOG
(June
19,
2018),
www.anticorruptionblog.com/data-protection-privacy/circuits-split-aboutborder-search-of-electronic-devices/ (analyzing the circuit split between the
Fourth and Ninth circuits and the Eleventh circuit).
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A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”22 By its very nature, this obligates any search conducted
by a government official to be reasonable.23 Although there is no
explicit language of privacy in the Fourth Amendment,24
established case law has created a practical right of privacy from
the Bill of Rights.25
Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States was the
pioneer position regarding implicit privacy interests in the Fourth
Amendment.26 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, wrote
that the Fourth Amendment was applicable only to physical search
and seizure and the Amendment did not forbid wiretapping.27 In his
dissent, Justice Brandeis famously defended “the right to be let
alone,” calling it “the most comprehensive of rights, and the right
most valued by civilized men.”28 He vigorously argued that the
reach of the Fourth Amendment (and other similar clauses
guaranteeing individual protection against specific abuses of power)
must have the capacity to adapt to a changing world.29 Justice
Brandeis recognized that the world was changing and developing in
ways that the Founding Fathers never could have anticipated.30 He
advocated for the protection of Americans’ privacy and argued that
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government, by whatever
means employed, must be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.31
The right of privacy officially embedded itself in Fourth
Amendment analysis because of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz v. United States.32 The majority held that the Fourth
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that a
right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights).
See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places, in the case of a man wiretapped on a
public payphone).
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (rejecting the Court’s holding
that the government does not need a warrant to wiretap phones).
27. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-465.
28. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that an enclosed
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Amendment protects people, not places, and therefore its reach
cannot depend upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion
into any given enclosure, effectively overruling Olmstead.33 Justice
Harlan’s concurrence went a step further and created a test to
determine when Fourth Amendment protection applies.34 The test
is composed of two parts: (1) the individual must have an actual
expectation of privacy, and (2) the expectation must be one society
recognizes as reasonable.35 However, Justice Harlan did not specify
the methods used to determine whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy had been established or how to determine if society would
recognize the expectation as reasonable.36 Additionally, the Katz
test for invasion of privacy is only applicable when the individual
who claims protection of the Fourth Amendment has a legitimate,
actual expectation of privacy in the invaded space.37
Despite these protections, custom and border agents have
virtually unlimited authority to search an individual and their
property, and detain persons entering the United States from a
foreign country through the border search exception as granted by
Congress.38

B. The Border Search Exception
One exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
exists for searches done at the international border.39 In 1789 the
First Congress enacted the border search exception which states
that a border search requires neither a warrant, probable cause, nor
any degree of suspicion.40 Reasonable suspicion is said to exist
telephone booth is more like a home than a field and a person has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his
conversations in such a place and the invasion of a constitutionally protected
place without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable).
33. Id. at 353.
34. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (2018). “The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe
regulations for the search of persons and baggage and he is authorized to employ
female inspectors for the examination and search of persons of their own sex;
and all persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be
liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the
Government under such regulations.” Id. See Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1344
(explaining the authority given to customs inspectors by Congress).
39. See generally Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624-25 (sustaining the search of
incoming mail). “Border searches [are] not subject to the warrant provisions of
the Fourth Amendment and [are] ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of [the
Fourth] Amendment.” Id. at 617.
40. An Act to regulate the Collection of Duties imposed by law on the tonnage
of ships or vessels, and on good, wares and merchandises imported to the United
States, ch. 5, §§ 23, 24, 1 Stat. 4 (1789); 19 U.S.C. § 507 (2018). See Ramsey, 431
U.S. at 616 (discussing how the First Congress granted full power and authority

1064

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:1057

simply by virtue of the person or item crossing the international
border.41 The international border means not only the border itself
but also its functional equivalent, e.g., an airport.42 The border
search exception also extends to the waters in and surrounding the
United States.43 The exception allows a customs official to board any
vessel, at any time, in any place in the United States and search
any part of it.44
The border search exception applies not only to persons and
property entering the United States, but to those leaving it as well.45
Although there is debate over the validity of the exception as
applied to those leaving the nation, that discussion is outside the
scope of this Comment.
The root of the Fourth Amendment border search exception lies
in the Government’s right as sovereign to protect the international
border and the occupants inside the nation.46 The United States has
the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in
protecting, its territorial integrity.47 Courts have historically
acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test

to customs officials to search incoming goods and wares).
41. Id. “That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding
right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and
property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact
that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended
demonstration.” Id (emphasis added).
42. See Denson, 574 F.3d at 1339 (expounding upon the way Fourth
Amendment protections wane at the international border, which includes
functional equivalents, such as an airport).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (2018).
44. Id.
45. See e.g., United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995)
(explaining the rationale for exempting border searches from the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements rests on fundamental
principles of national sovereignty, which apply equally to exit and entry
searches); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974) (agreeing in dicta
that “those entering and leaving the country may be examined as to their
belongings and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment”); United
States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 839 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that “although courts
traditionally have employed the border search exception to uphold warrantless
searches of persons or objects entering the United States, the rationale behind
this exception applies with equal force to persons or objects leaving the country:
the Government has an interest in protecting some interest of United States'
citizens, the individual is on notice that his privacy may be invaded when he
crosses the border”).
46. See Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544 (holding that customs
officials are charged with more than an investigative role, they are also charged
with protecting the nation from entrants who may bring anything harmful into
the country); Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (declaring that the government’s
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith
at the international border); Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 727 (affirming that
the United States' paramount interest in conducting searches at its borders is
national self-protection).
47. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 153.
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balances individual privacy and the interests of the Government.48
However, it is also acknowledged that the balance of reasonableness
is qualitatively different at the international border than in the
interior.49 That distinction weighs heavily in the Government’s
favor when the search is conducted at the international border.50

C. The Effect of Time and Technology on the Border
Search Exception
While the border search exception has remained generally
untouched since its inception, the scope of the exception has
expanded substantially.51 What began as a regulation of import
duties has transformed over centuries to combat new threats to the
border.52 Over the past century, the border search exception has
expanded to cover: prohibition;53 opening international mail;54
detaining a woman suspected of smuggling drugs;55 removing,
disassembling, and searching a vehicle’s gas tank;56 and seizing
child pornography.57 Through all of these analyses, one thing
remained constant: the preeminence of the Government’s authority
48. See Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540 (explaining how “the Fourth
Amendment balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy
right of the individual is struck much more favorably to the Government at the
border”).
49. Id. at 538.
50. See Denson, 574 F.3d at 1339 (asserting that the government’s interest
in preventing persons and effects from entering the nation rises to its zenith at
the international border).
51. See Victoria Wilson, Laptops and The Border Search Exception To The
Fourth Amendment: Protecting The United States Borders From Bombs, Drugs,
And The Pictures From Your Vacation, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1003-05 (2001)
(discussing the history of the border exception and how the justification for the
border exception has grown as the nation faces new problems and technologies).
52. Id.
53. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (sustaining that it is reasonable for travelers to
be stopped when crossing an international boundary and be required to identify
themselves because of national self-protection which allowed the officers in this
instance to stop and search the vehicle carrying illegal alcohol).
54. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 625 (holding customs agents who opened eight
envelopes from Thailand and found heroin inside were within their rights under
the border exception to do so and they did not need a warrant).
55. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 544 (holding that because Montoya de
Hernandez’s detention occurred at the international border and the border
agents had reason to suspect her of smuggling narcotics in her alimentary canal,
her detention of over sixteen hours was reasonable).
56. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (holding the Fourth Amendment does not
require custom agents at the international border to have reasonable suspicion
to inspect a vehicle’s fuel tank and the interference is justified by the
Government’s paramount interest in protecting the border).
57 Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 732 (finding that a suspicion-less search of
a cabin on a foreign cargo ship that was docked three miles up the Miami River
that turned up child pornography was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment
because there are no inspection-free zones on a foreign cargo ship at the border).
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and interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and
effects at the international border.
The scope of the border search exception includes persons and
their belongings,58 but a person and property are necessarily treated
differently.59 No articulable suspicion is necessary for basic, noninvasive border searches of a person.60 This means that a pat-down
or frisk can be conducted on nothing more than the choice of the
customs agent because reasonable suspicion is said to exist simply
because the person is crossing the international border.61
The suspicion required for a more intrusive search of a person
hinges upon the level of insult to personal privacy impressed upon
the victim of a search.62 In United States v. Vega-Barvo, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed and set
forth three factors which contribute to the personal indignity
suffered by the person searched: (1) physical contact between the
searcher and the person searched; (2) exposure of intimate body
parts; and (3) use of force.63
However, this sliding scale to determine intrusiveness has
been rejected in the context of property.64 Property does not carry
with it the indelible right of dignity, and property cannot be
personally offended nor can it suffer emotionally from a search.65
Precedent holds that searches of closed containers and their
contents require no particularized suspicion.66 The concept of closed
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (stating “but the reasons that might
support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive
searches of the person--dignity and privacy interests of the person being
searched--simply do not carry over to vehicles”).
60. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1345.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1346. “[T]he personal indignity suffered by the individual searched
controls the level of suspicion required to make the search reasonable.” Id.
63. Id.
64. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that applying the sliding intrusiveness scale to determine when reasonable
suspicion is needed to search property at the border is misplaced). See also
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (stating that the Supreme Court's analysis
determining what protection to give a vehicle was not based on the unique
characteristics of vehicles with respect to other property, but was based on the
fact that a vehicle, as a piece of property, simply does not implicate the same
"dignity and privacy" concerns as "highly intrusive searches of the person").
65. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. While it is true that property cannot
suffer indignity, one can easily imagine circumstances where the exposure of
sensitive information can lead to a person suffering embarrassment or
emotional harm.
66. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010 (reversing the District Court’s grant of a
motion to suppress child pornography found during a border search of Arnold’s
laptop); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (determining that mode of entry does not limit
the border search exception and there is no additional requirement of probable
cause in order for a border search to be reasonable); Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at
1345 (“A person’s decision to cross our national boundary is justification enough
for…a search.”).
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containers has encompassed luggage, gas tanks, and laptops.67 This
precedent has been questioned and challenged over time, to no
distinct resolution.68 How the treatment of property applies to the
searches of electronic devices has created serious privacy concerns
regarding digital data.69
In this digital age, Americans’ awareness and concern over
issues of privacy are heightened.70 As dependency on technology
grows,71 so does the conundrum of how to ensure personal privacy
while also maintaining safety and national security.72 It is difficult
to find a balance between guaranteeing individual privacy and
protecting national security. The U.S. Customs and Border
Protection is not unaware of these challenges and maintains that
electronic device searches help to identify, investigate, and
prosecute individuals who use technology to commit crimes.73
While Congress and the Supreme Court have remained
relatively silent regarding digital privacy at the international
border,74 recently, substantial strides have been made towards
protecting user data and privacy outside the scope of border
searches.75 As recently as June 2018, the Supreme Court held in
67. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (stating that customs officials can search,
without probable cause and without a warrant, luggage); Flores-Montano, 541
U.S. at 155-56 (holding that searching a gas tank and taking apart an engine
was justified); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (holding that border search of a laptop
should not have been suppressed).
68. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 (holding that “while it may be true that
some searches of property are so destructive as to require a different result, this
was not one of them”).
69. See Deeva Shah, Electronics at the Border: An Exception to the Border
Search Doctrine?, MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV (Nov. 2015),
www.mttlr.org/2015/11/12/electronics-at-the-border-an-exception-to-theborder-search-doctrine/ (detailing concerns surrounding privacy that have
arisen from border searches of sensitive information via electronics).
70. The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21,
2016),
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-inamerica/ (providing a report regarding privacy concerns of Americans and how
their data is getting treated and used by the companies that collect it).
71. Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
72. See Anja Kaspersen, Can You Have Both Security and Privacy in the
Internet Age?, WORLD ECON. F. (July 21, 2015), www.weforum.org/
agenda/2015/07/can-you-have-both-security-and-privacy-in-the-internet-age/
(discussing the reach of government agencies, the effect on users, the need for
transparency, and the need for safety).
73. CBP FY17 Statistics, supra note 1 (considering the need for border
searches of electronic devices as part of their mission to protect the American
people and enforce the nation’s law in the digital age).
74. Matthew Feeney, Privacy Still at Risk Despite New CBP Search Rules,
CATO INST. (Jan. 8, 2018), www.cato.org/blog/privacy-still-risk-despite-new-cbpsearch-rules (explaining that without legislation or Supreme Court action,
privacy at the border will be dependent on Customs and Border Patrol Policies).
75. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018)
(holding that a warrant is required for police to access cell site location from a
cell phone company); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (holding that
the police officers generally could not, without a warrant, search digital
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Carpenter v. United States that a warrant is generally required for
police to access cell site location information from a cell phone
company.76 This ruling was a big win for advocates of digital
privacy.
While Carpenter is a narrow ruling, it may have far reaching
implications for the kind of data that is held by third parties, such
as browsing data, text messages, emails, and bank records.77 While
this holding does indicate that the Supreme Court could be moving
towards more protection of digital privacy in the form of warrants,
any analysis of Carpenter itself and the future implications of this
holding are beyond the scope of this Comment.
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided in Riley v. California that
“what the police must do before searching a cell phone seized
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”78 In a
unanimous decision, the Court held that the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is not applicable in the circumstances of a forensic
search of a cell phone.79 The Court acknowledged that this does not
mean that data on a cell phone is not searchable, it just means that
officers must get a warrant before they forensically search the
device.80 The Court also acknowledged that the well-recognized
“exigencies of the situation” exception would still apply and other
case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a
particular phone.81
The problem with the holding in Riley is that it applies only to
searches incident to arrest—a warrant exception that has no
bearing on border searches.82 Although both the search incident to
arrest exception and the border search exception are exempt from
information on the cell phones seized from the defendants as incident to the
defendants' arrests).
76. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. The Court stressed that this case is about
“a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every
moment, over several years.” Id. at 2220. This level of inquiry raises serious
privacy concerns that cannot be ignored and does not overcome Fourth
Amendment protection.
77. See Louise Matsakis, The Supreme Court Just Greatly Strengthened
Digital Privacy, WIRED (June 12, 2018), www.wired.com/story/carpenter-vunited-states-supreme-court-digital-privacy/ (discussing the ruling in
Carpenter v. United States, including the history of the case and the future
implications).
78. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 401.
81. Id. at 402.
82. Id. at 386. Compare Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (“The border-search
exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject
to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may
enter the country.”) with Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158 (“When a man is legally
arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which
it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may
be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”).
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the warrant protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, they
are not related in any other fashion.83
Despite clear situational differences between the search
incident to arrest in Riley and a border search, some courts have
found the Court’s reasoning and analysis of the privacy implications
instructive in dealing with privacy concerns during forensic
searches of electronic devices during a border search.84

III. ANALYSIS
This section explores the Federal Circuit split that has arisen
due to judicial interpretation of the border search exception and the
issue of digital privacy in forensic searches of electronics in border
searches. Part A begins by exploring the balance between
Americans’ expectation of privacy and what we are willing to give
up in the name of national security.85 Part B illustrates how that
balance has shifted because of the advancement and continued
reliance on technology.86 Part C explains how searches at the
international border are constitutionally and situationally different
from those not at the international border.87 Part D will analyze the
circuit split regarding forensic electronic border searches.88 Part E
will explain how that circuit split creates a fundamental issue
regarding how the rights of people vary depending upon where they
cross the international border.89

A. How Much of Our Privacy Do We Trade for Security?
The practice of trading pieces of individual freedoms for safety
and social order is not a new concept. The theory of the social
contract has existed for hundreds of years and was a decidedly large
ideological part of the American Revolution.90 The theory of the
social contract is predicated upon citizens relinquishing some
natural rights in exchange for a government or state which protects
the remaining rights.91 The concept written into the Declaration of
83. Infra Section III, C.
84. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146-47 (“After Riley, we think it is clear that a
forensic search of a digital phone must be treated as a nonroutine border search,
requiring some form of individualized suspicion.”).
85. Infra Section III, A.
86. Infra Section III, B.
87. Infra Section III, C.
88. Infra Section III, D.
89. Infra Section III, E.
90. See Martin Kelly, The Social Contract, THOUGHTCO (Aug. 5, 2019),
www.thoughtco.com/social-contract-in-politics-105424 (discussing how Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau’s philosophical and political
stances on the social contract influenced the Founding Fathers, particularly
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison).
91. Betsey Sue Casman, The Right to Privacy in Light of the Patriot Act and
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Independence92 and the United States Constitution (and any
constitution for that matter) is a giant social contract written
between People and their Government.93
The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment fits into
this philosophy. The power of customs officials to search persons
and property attempting to cross the international border—a
freedom given up—was granted by Congress—as the people—as a
way to ensure national security and safety.94 But shouldn’t there be
limits on how much privacy can be intruded upon?
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Montoya De
Hernandez, limited the types of searches that can be done on a
person without distinct reasonable suspicion.95 The concept of
routine versus nonroutine searches was borne from Montoya De
Hernandez.96 Routine searches are not subject to any requirement
of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant.97 The
detention of a traveler beyond the scope of a routine customs search
and inspection however, is justified only when supported by
reasonable suspicion.98 Yet, the holding of Montoya De Hernandez
is limited, as the Court pointedly noted that the holding was not
suggestive regarding whether any level of suspicion would be
required for any other type of nonroutine border search.99
Since Montoya De Hernandez, the Court has declined to extend
a heightened level of suspicion requirement for the search of
property. In United States v. Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court

Social Contract Theory (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas) (on file with UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional
Papers, and Capstones).
92. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring,
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed.”).
93. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.”).
94. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (2020).
95. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 531.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 538. Routine searches of travelers can include “questioning,
patdowns, and thorough searches of their belongings.” Id. at 551.
98. Id. at 541. (“We hold that the detention of a traveler at the border,
beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its
inception if customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler
and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in
her alimentary canal.”).
99. Id. at 541 n.4. (“[B]ecause the issues are not presented today we suggest
no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border
searches such as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.”).
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reprimanded the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for creating a
routine versus nonroutine balancing test and applying it to
vehicles.100 The Court in Flores-Montano clarified that the reasons
that might support a requirement of additional levels of suspicion—
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—simply
do not carry over to vehicles.101
The Supreme Court has kept open the possibility that some
searches of property may be so destructive as to require
particularized suspicion, but has not elaborated on this.102
Precedent illustrates that searches of luggage,103 mail,104 and
vehicles105 are all searches of property that do not require any
particularized or additional suspicion.

B. The Technologically Rising Stakes Have Changed
the Game
With the advent of the digital age, property now includes
belongings such as laptops and cellphones. This has become an often
litigated issue, as smartphones and other personal electronic
devices contain vastly more private information than other
containers that the border exception applies to.106 However, courts
are generally reluctant to grant defendants’ motions to suppress
evidence obtained from electronic border searches.107 Some courts
avoid answering the question of whether additional reasonable
suspicion is required for forensic searches completely by simply
stating that even if specific reasonable suspicion was necessary, it
was there.108
What is a forensic search of an electronic device? A forensic
100. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (stating that the complex
balancing tests to determine the intrusiveness “of a search of a person have no
place in the border searches of vehicles”).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 155-56 (discussing that there may be a time in which a search of
property is so destructive that it requires reasonable suspicion, but that this
case is not one of those times).
103. See Thirty-Seven Photographs (37), 402 U.S. at 376 (stating that
“customs officers characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is
not questioned in this case; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with
excluding illegal articles from the country”).
104. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (stating that it is the entry into the country
that makes the resulting search of the mail reasonable).
105. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (2018).
106. Savage & Nixon, supra note 6.
107. Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is a "Nonroutine" Border
Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
277, 283 (2017).
108. Id. The problem with not addressing whether additional reasonable
suspicion is required is that courts are side-stepping the issue. There is no clear
answer whether or not reasonable suspicion is required and that provides the
American people with no guidance of what to do in these situations.
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search typically begins with the creation of a copy or “image” of the
original storage device saved as a “read only” file.109 Then, customs
or law enforcement agents use software which allows them to
analyze the data on the imaged hard drive and provides the agent
with access to password protected, hidden, encrypted, or deleted
files.110 It is an exhaustive search of everything the electronic device
can show evidence of; it is “essentially a computer strip search.”111
While codified law stays unchanged by Congress, judicially
created law surrounding electronics is in flux.112 In United States v.
Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the idea that
all property is the same under the border search exception and held
that reasonable suspicion is required for forensic searches of
electronics at the border.113 The Ninth Circuit Court stated that the
exposure of confidential and personal information has permanence
that cannot be undone, unlike the physical search of other
property.114 That kind of sweeping search into the most intimate
details of a person’s life is a significant intrusion upon personal
privacy and dignity.115 The very nature of the data held on personal
electronic devices is different from that of other property.116
Electronic devices in the twenty-first century act as diaries,
planners, record keepers of financial and medical information, and
the
preferred
method
of
personal
and
professional
communication.117
However, the Cotterman holding has not had a far-reaching
influence beyond the Ninth Circuit and courts under its jurisdiction.
The real change came when the Supreme Court held in Riley v.
California that police officers must obtain a warrant before
forensically searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest.118
109. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2014)
(describing what a border search entails and applying the border search
exception to a forensic search of cell phones done several hundred miles from
the border crossing).
110. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 963 n.9 (explaining the kind of software
that Agent Owen used, called EnCase, while forensically searching Cotterman’s
laptop).
111. Id. at 966. “An exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive
intrudes upon privacy and dignity interests to a far greater degree than a
cursory search at the border.” Id.
112. Savage & Nixon, supra note 6.
113. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968.
114. Id. at 966 (stating that unlike searches involving a reassembled gas
tank, there is no way to fix or undo what was done in the release of that personal
information).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 964.
117. Id. These most intimate details of a person’s life are deserving of
protection and should require reasonable suspicion in order to access.
118. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (holding that the forensic search of
defendants’ cell phones and evidence obtained from the cell phones that used to
charge the defendants with additional charges was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment and required a warrant).
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The Court delved deep into the privacy implications of a forensic cell
phone search, recognizing the wealth of information that becomes
available during a forensic search.119 The Court also refused to treat
cell phones as just another form of a container, noting that cell
phones are different in both qualitative and quantitative senses
from typical containers, such as wallets or bags.120 Modern cell
phones are more than just a technological convenience; for many
Americans they hold the most private details of their life.121 The
Court focused on the protection of information provided by the
Fourth Amendment and concluded that simply because the
advancement of technology allows for such information to be held
on a cell phone does not make that information any less worthy of
protection.122 It must be considered that before the digital era,
people did not walk around carrying a cache of sensitive personal
information on them when they went about their day.123
The Court stressed the importance of the modern cell phone’s
immense storage capacity and mused that the digital capacity for
storage would only grow with time.124 When the Supreme Court
decided Riley in 2014, the top-selling phone had a standard storage
capacity of 16 gigabytes with an option to upgrade to 64
gigabytes.125 In the first quarter of 2018, the top selling phone126
had a standard storage capacity of 64 gigabytes and the option of
upgrading to 256 gigabytes.127 In just four years, the standard
storage capacity has increased exponentially.
While the Riley Court eliminated the ability to immediately
forensically search cellphones under the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement, the Court limited its holding
by stating that there still may be case-specific exceptions where a
warrantless search of a phone may be justified.128 However, the
dissection of those possibilities and the implications for future

119. Id. at 393-94.
120. Id. at 391-92.
121. Id. at 403.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 394 (concluding that there is an element of pervasiveness that
characterizes cell phones but not physical records). Prior to the digital age,
people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with
them as they went about their day. Id.
124. Id. “[Cell phones] are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have
the capacity to be used as a telephone.” Id. at 393.
125. Id. at 394.
126. Justin Jaffe & Eric Franklin, iPhone X was the Best-Selling
Smartphone in Early 2018, CNET (May 5, 2018), www.cnet.com/news/iphone-xwas-best-selling-smartphone-in-early-2018/.
127. Compare iPhone Models, APPLE, www.apple.com/iphone/compare (last
visited Oct. 26, 2018).
128. Riley, 573 U.S. at 402 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460
(2011)) (noting that “one well-recognized exception applies when the ‘exigencies
of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a]
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
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searches incident to arrest are beyond the scope of this Comment.

C. Where and How a Search Takes Place Matters
United States citizens have certain inalienable rights and the
right to interstate travel is one of those fundamental rights.129
Interstate travel at its most basic definition refers to the travel from
one state to another.130 When it comes to a search done during
interstate travel, citizens have a right to be free of interruption or
search unless there is probable cause for a stop.131 The Fourth
Amendment protects people against unreasonable search and
seizure and this usually translates to the need for probable cause or
a warrant.132
But, as previously discussed, border searches are not subject to
the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment and are per se
reasonable within the meaning of that Amendment under the
border search exception.133 There is also no fundamental or
protected right to international travel.134 Therefore, international
travelers may be stopped while crossing the international border
and may be required to identify and subject themselves and their
belongings to a search.135 The fact that a person or item is crossing
the international border coupled with the government’s paramount
interest in preventing unwanted persons and effects from entering
the country makes searches at the border reasonable.136

129. See Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Freedom of Movement at a Standstill? Toward
the Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel, 90 B. U. L. REV.
2461, 2465 (2010) (discussing the fundamental right to interstate travel). “The
Supreme Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to restrictions on the
right to interstate travel.” Id. The fundamental nature of the right to interstate
travel is undisputed and the roots of this fundamental right are hinged in a
multitude of constitutional provisions and concepts. Id. at 2466.
130. Id. at 2464.
131. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154. "But those lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized
to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise.” Id.
132. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 381 (discussing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as being ruled by reasonableness and reasonableness generally
requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant).
133. See supra Part II, Section B (discussing the border search exception).
134. See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123,
125 (1973) (observing that “import restrictions and searches of persons or
packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different
rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations”).
135. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154. "Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an
international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.” Id.
136. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619 (holding that border searches are
reasonable by the single fact that a person or item has entered the country and
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The distinction between interstate and international travel for
the purposes of searches under the Fourth Amendment is essential
to understanding where and what can and cannot be done during
each respective search.137
A search incident to arrest can take place anywhere an arrest
occurs and has historically been recognized as its own Fourth
Amendment exception to the warrant requirement.138 The search
incident to arrest doctrine is valid everywhere in the United States
and is rooted in concern for officer safety and the preservation of
evidence.139
Conversely, border searches necessarily happen at the
international border or at its functional equivalent.140 The
international border for purposes of border search authority means
within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United
States.141 The border search exception is rooted in the Government’s
principal interest of national security and securing the border.142
The difference between these two exceptions is one reason
courts have disagreed on whether the Supreme Court’s holding in
Riley is applicable to border searches—border searches at the
international border are situationally and constitutionally different
than searches incident to arrests which necessarily happen in the
there is no additional requirement of probable cause); see also Flores-Montano,
541 U.S. at 152 (stating that “the government’s interest in preventing the entry
of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border”).
137. See generally Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616 (noting the difference between
searches at the international border and those done in the interior). “Section 24
of [the first customs statute] granted customs officials full power and authority
to enter and search any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to
suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed. This
acknowledgment of plenary customs power was differentiated from the more
limited power to enter and search any particular dwelling-house, store,
building, or other place where a warrant upon cause to suspect was required.”
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 381 (discussing the existence of the warrant
exception for search incident to arrest). “In 1914, this Court first acknowledged
in dictum ‘the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under
English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.’” Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1964). Since that time, it has been well accepted that
such a search constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 382.
139. Riley, 573 U.S. at 381-85.
140. See Denson, 574 F.3d at 1339 (reaffirming the border search’s
application at the international border and its functional counterparts, like an
airport).
141. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2020) (“The term reasonable distance, as used in
section 287(a)(3) of the Act, means within 100 air miles from any external
boundary of the United States or any shorter distance which may be fixed by
the chief patrol agent for CBP, or the special agent in charge for ICE, or, so far
as the power to board and search aircraft is concerned any distance fixed
pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section.”).
142. See generally Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (analyzing the history of the border
search exception and finding it well-founded).
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country.143

D. Where the Circuits Do Not Agree
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was ahead of the curve (and
ahead of the Supreme Court’s holding in Riley) in Cotterman with
its holding that particularized reasonable suspicion must be present
before a forensic search of electronic devices could be conducted.144
This precedent has bound the Ninth Circuit and its jurisdictional
under-courts to this standard.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v.
Kolsuz on May 9, 2018 and held that after Riley, “a forensic border
search of a phone must be treated as nonroutine, permissible only
on a showing of individualized suspicion.”145 The Fourth Circuit
latched onto the reasoning in Riley that cell phones are unlike other
containers and contain vast amounts of information, making a
search of such devices extremely invasive.146 The fact that so much
information is kept on a digital device and the pervasiveness of the
devices in modern society makes it both unreasonable and
unrealistic for a traveler to leave their digital devices at home when
traveling internationally.147 The Fourth Circuit Court in Kolsuz
concluded that because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley and
the supporting decision from Cotterman regarding digital privacy,
there cannot be another interpretation of what the requirements
should be regarding forensic searches of electronics at the border.148
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Touset was decided just fourteen days after Kolsuz on May 23, 2018
and held: “we see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would
require suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when
it imposes no such requirement for a search of other personal
property.”149 The Eleventh Circuit Court rejected the argument that
electronic devices should receive special treatment because they are
inescapable in modern society or can store vast amounts of data.150
The role of border agents remains the same, despite the
advancement of technology: to prevent the unwanted entry of
143. See generally Riley, 573 U.S. 373 (discussing the traditional reasons for
the existing search incident to arrest warrant exception: danger to officer safety
and the preservation of evidence during an arrest); see also Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (stating the reason for the border search exception: “the longstanding right
of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and
property crossing into this country”). Id. at 616.
144. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 963.
145 Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144.
146. Id. at 145-46.
147. Id. at 145.
148. See id. at 144-47 (analyzing the privacy implications regarding the scale
and nature of data stored on a cell phone).
149. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
150. Id.
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persons and contraband at the international border.151 The Touset
court also rejected the analogy of a forensic electronic search to that
of a strip search, relying on the Eleventh Circuit precedent that the
factors by which a search is judged regarding personal indignity are
“irrelevant to searches of electronic devices.”152
The Touset Court addressed the holdings in Cotterman and
Kolsuz, but remained unpersuaded by their reasoning.153 The
application of Riley to border searches was resoundingly rejected,
stating that Riley is limited to the search incident to arrest
exception related to cell phones and does not apply to border
searches.154 The Touset court further stated that a traveler’s privacy
should not be given preference over the interest of the government
in securing and protecting its territorial integrity and rejected the
idea that international travelers have no practical options to protect
their privacy while traveling abroad.155 The Eleventh Circuit noted
that there is no guarantee to travel without inconvenience and
suggested that any property a person does not want searched can
be left at home.156 The main holding that no additional reasonable
suspicion is required for forensic electronic searches is contrary to
the holdings from both the Ninth and the Fourth circuits.157

151. See id. (analogizing the responsibility and right of border agents to
searching a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractor-trailer
filled with boxes of documents).
152. Id. at 1234. “A forensic search of an electronic device is not like a strip
search or an x-ray; it does not require border agents to touch a traveler's body,
to expose intimate body parts, or to use any physical force against him.
Although it may intrude on the privacy of the owner, a forensic search of an
electronic device is a search of property.” Id.
153. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 952 (equating a forensic electronic search
to a strip search and finding that kind of search a substantial intrusion upon
personal privacy and dignity requiring a probable cause to search); Kolsuz, 890
F.3d at 146-47 (holding that the Supreme Court in Riley made it clear that a
forensic search of a cell phone requires individualized suspicion).
154. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (stating that although the Supreme Court
stressed the risk of intrusion into privacy by a forensic phone search, Riley
applies to the search incident to arrest exception and does not apply to searches
at the border); United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (2018) (stating
that in Riley, “the Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to the searchincident-to-arrest exception”).
155. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits stressed the
impracticality of removing or deleting files before traveling and argued that it
is unreasonable for travelers to leave their devices at home while traveling. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this idea, reminding everyone that a traveler’s
expectation of privacy is less at the border. Id.
156. Id. The court in Touset contrasted the capability of leaving property at
home to the inability to leave your person at home—a rationalization for why
there is a test for the searches of people and why that test does not apply to
property. Id.
157. Id. at 1237. The Eleventh Circuit added a now familiar alternative
holding stating that even if reasonable suspicion is required, there was
reasonable suspicion. Id.
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E. The Problem That A Circuit Split Creates
The issue that this circuit split creates is clear: where an
individual crosses the international border defines how their Fourth
Amendment rights are handled.158 This situation runs contrary to a
central theme of American ideology—that every person be treated
equally. In this case, that means an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights are the same regardless of where they cross the
international border. Without guidance from Congress, the
judiciary is forced to rule on issues of modern digital privacy using
outdated stare decisis.159 Not all judges are pleased with creating
precedent this way, some even writing in concurring160 opinions
that they believe the responsibility to determine this issue lies with
Congress, not the judiciary.161

IV. PROPOSAL
In order to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of the
American people, this circuit split needs to be resolved. The circuit
split is problematic because of the inconsistencies in the method and
determination of forensic searches of electronics and the treatment
of the American people and their property depending upon where
they cross the international border. Any solution to the issue of
forensic border searches of electronics must strike a balance
between an individual’s expectation and right of privacy and the
Government’s paramount interest in national security and securing
the international border.162
This Comment advocates for a solution which would
immediately resolve the circuit split. The Supreme Court first
should grant certiorari to a case where the central concern is the
level of suspicion required for forensic searches of electronics at the
international border. In its decision, the Supreme Court should hold

158. Hobbs & Zeno, supra note 21.
159. Wessler & Bhandari, supra note 16.
160. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 404-08 (agreeing with the holding of the court but
stating that the legislature is in a better position to assess and respond to the
changes that have occurred or will in the future). “In light of these
developments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st
century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of
the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 456.
161. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148-53 (agreeing with the majority but arguing
that the majority opinion is created law that is better left up to the legislative
and executive branches). “If individualized suspicion is to be required in order
to conduct what the majority asserts is a "nonroutine border search," then
Congress must say so.” Id. at 148.
162. See Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540 (explaining how the Fourth
Amendment balance between the interests of the Government and the privacy
right of the individual is “struck much more favorably to the Government at the
border”).
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that under the current written law, forensic electronic searches
conducted at the international border do not require any additional
or individualized suspicion as they are per se reasonable.163 It is
imperative to the balance of the government and for the needs of
the American people that if significant alterations are made to the
border search exception to the Fourth Amendment, Congress needs
to be the branch of government to decide what the standard should
be.

A. Why the Supreme Court Needs to Step In, But Not
Take Charge
The uniform interpretation of federal law is central to the idea
of the structure and function of the federal court system.164 The
Supreme Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction, the
power of judicial review, and the power to grant or to deny
certiorari.165 What is missing from that substantial list of powers?
The power to write the laws that govern the American people. That
power lies within the legislative branch: the two bodies of
Congress.166 It is the responsibility of Congress to create legislation
that reflects the values of the American people and sets policy for
the nation; courts only borrow the lawmaking powers of Congress
in situations where ambiguous statutes call for interpretation or
clarification.167
With the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement, there is no ambiguity: a search done at the
border is per se reasonable.168 Despite the interpretation of Riley by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has given
no indication that forensic electronic searches at the border require
any additional or individualized suspicion. In the last border search
case where the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Court held
that “the reasons that might support a requirement of some level of

163. An Act to regulate the Collection of Duties imposed by law on the
tonnage of ships or vessels, and on good, wares and merchandises imported to
the United States, §§ 23, 24. See 19 U.S.C. § 507 (2018).
164. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1568
(2008) (discussing the federal courts’ job of ensuring uniformity of the law and
providing greater consistency in the interpretation of law).
165. U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (granting
the Supreme Court the power to declare legislative or executive action in
violation of the Constitution); 28 U.S.C.S. § 1254 (2018) (“Cases in the courts of
appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: (1)
By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or
criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree.”).
166. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
167. Frost, supra note 164, at 1607 (describing why Congress is the more
appropriate branch of government to make decisions regarding the meaning of
federal law and deciding policy).
168. See supra Part II, B.
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suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—simply
do not carry over to vehicles.”169 There, the Court drew a line
between the treatment of people and property, and the dignity of a
person simply cannot be compared to the dignity of an electronic
device.170
The Court should reaffirm its prior holdings and dicta that at
the international border, the Fourth Amendment’s balance of
reasonableness is qualitatively different than at the interior and an
individual has a lesser expectation of privacy due to the
government’s paramount interest in protecting the nation.171 A
Supreme Court ruling would guarantee that international travelers’
Fourth Amendment rights are treated the same across the nation
and that travelers know exactly what to expect no matter where
they crossed the border.
Moreover, this strict adherence to the law as it is written may
be the only way to push Congress into drafting legislation that may
be better suited to the digital world of today. The Supreme Court
has denied certiorari to three cases regarding forensic electronic
searches conducted at the border in the last ten years.172 Those
three cases arose from either the Ninth or the Eleventh circuits, one
of those cases being the aforementioned Cotterman. The Supreme
Court even had the opportunity in United States v. Vergara to
address whether its decision and rationale in Riley could be applied
to electronic searches at the border yet instead chose to spurn the
opportunity.
These actions by the Supreme Court could arguably be
interpreted as the Supreme Court trying not to be the deciding
authority on forensic searches of electronics at the border.173 By
169. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
170. Id.
171. See generally Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 (holding that the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test is weighed differently at the border
than the interior); Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 153 (discussing the United
States’ paramount interest in conducting searches at the border is national selfprotection).
172. See Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1176 (2009) (denying
certiorari when the Ninth Circuit reversed a motion to suppress information
found on a laptop during a border search); Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 899 (2014) (denying certiorari when the Ninth Circuit held (a) that
reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of a laptop and (b) that
border agents had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search); Vergara, 884
F.3d 1309, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 70 (2018) (denying certiorari when the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant’s conviction and held that Riley does not
apply to border searches).
173. It is interesting that the Supreme Court refused certiorari to recent
forensic electronic border search cases yet granted certiorari to Riley and held
the way it did. Considering the distinction the Court has previously drawn
between persons and property in the context of border searches, some may
interpret the silence of the Court as its desire not to intervene and disturb its
own precedent.
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affirming the law as it is written, the Supreme Court can ensure
uniform application of the border search exception to the Fourth
Amendment without having to make a sweeping promulgation on
the balance to be struck between digital privacy and national
security.

B. The Responsibility of Creating New Privacy Law
Lies with Congress
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito said it best in his
concurring opinion in Riley: “It would be very unfortunate if privacy
protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal
courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”174
With the advancement and the role of technology in modern society,
there is a wealth of information potentially available on electronic
devices that has never been available during a search before. It is
primarily because of this wealth of information that “searching
their contents implicates very sensitive privacy interests that [the
Supreme Court] is poorly positioned to understand and evaluate.”175
Justice Alito went as far as to say that he would reconsider the
questions presented in Riley if either Congress or state legislature
enacted legislation on the topic.176
The legislative branch is tasked with many responsibilities,
but the most important of those is to improve the general welfare—
to make law. Those laws should effectively solve problems and
reflect the values of the American people it represents.177 Justice
Wilkinson in his concurring opinion in Kolsuz adamantly
maintained that the standard of reasonableness for a border search
should principally be a legislative question, not a judicial one.178
Congress has the ability and the means to investigate, research, and
hold hearings to try and resolve the tension between privacy and
security interests at the border through a thorough examination of
the issues.179
174. Riley, 573 U.S. at 407-08. While Justice Alito ultimately agreed with
the Court’s holding, he was more concerned with the role the Court should play
in regulating electronic surveillance. Id. Justice Alito contended that the
legislatures are in a better position than the Supreme Court to respond and
assess the changes in the privacy arena. Id.
175. Id. at 407.
176. Id.
177. Gregory Koger, The Job of Congress: A Primer, VOX (Apr. 17, 2018),
www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2018/4/17/17235516/congress-job-primer
(discussing what the American people should want and expect from the
legislative branch of government).
178. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148 (arguing that the handling of the level of
reasonableness in a border search calls for “the greatest caution and
circumspection” and that the legislative and executive branches have much to
offer in the determination).
179. Id. at 150 (articulating the types of questions that need to be asked
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Despite the fact that the right of privacy has been judicially
established, the standard of reasonableness and suspicion required
for a forensic electronic search at the border is an issue that should
not be formed in this way. This is a sensitive issue and the depths
to which a forensic search can probe into an individual’s personal
life is disturbing. But the border search exception to the Fourth
Amendment continues to serve its fundamental purpose of securing
the international borders and protecting the people and the nation.
As technology continues to advance and evolve, so must the law
enforcement agencies that are duty-bound to identify, investigate,
and prosecute those who would use these advancements for malign
purposes.180
It would be a mistake for Congress to rely upon the U.S.
Customs Border and Protection Agency’s Directives to choose what
level of suspicion is required in order to perform searches at the
international border.181 Although the latest directive requires
reasonable suspicion for a forensic search, the problem is that the
direction is coming from a federal agency and not from Congress.
This is an issue that has implications far greater than just the
search itself. Matters of national security and individual privacy
rights are too important to allow anything less than the full effort
of Congress to have a significant impact. Congress can use its
considerable resources to investigate how to better balance the
privacy needs of the American people and the nation’s need for
national security and use that information to subsequently decide
whether additional reasonable suspicion is required.

V. CONCLUSION
The world in which the modern American lives is full of
increasingly subtle dangers as everyday life becomes more and more
intricately interwoven with digital devices. Growing in tandem with
the convenience and ease of technology are the intrusions and
inconveniences that necessarily accompany technological
advancement. Regardless of the era of American society, the
Government’s right to perform a search at the international border
is one such inconvenience that has always been necessary to achieve
the goal of national security, and searches of electronic devices are
merely an extension of the powers already granted via legislation
and supported through hundreds of years of precedent.
when looking at the tension between privacy and security interests at the
border).
180. See CBP FY17 Statistics, supra note 1 (detailing why it is important for
customs and border patrol agents to adapt to changing technology and why the
searches of electronic devices are imperative to safety).
181. Id. (requiring, for “advanced searches,” otherwise known as a forensic
electronic search, that there be reasonable suspicion by the agent conducting
the search or a national security concern).
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This Comment’s solution to the federal circuit split created by
the question of suspicion required to forensically search an
electronic device at the border suggests that the Supreme Court
step in and affirm that the border search exception requires no
additional reasonable suspicion. This affirmation is necessary in
order to ensure uniform application of the law. If Congress believes
that digital privacy at the border needs to be reassessed, they have
the methods and the means to investigate and determine what the
standard should be. The privacy concerns of the American people
are many and the legislature, elected by the people, are in the best
position to assess the legitimate needs of law enforcement and to
respond to the growing privacy concerns surrounding forensic
electronic searches. Until that day, forensic border searches of
electronic devices at the international border should be per se
reasonable.
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